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Abstract 
This paper examines the Sandline Affair that occurred in the late 
1990s in the United Kingdom and analyzes the process by which the 
British government officials became involved in violating United 
Nations sanctions against Sierra Leone during a civil war in the 1990s. 
In 1997, a military coup which was the third one since the outbreak of 
the conflict occurred, the civilian government was overthrown, and 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was forced into exile in Guinea. The 
international community expressed its disapproval of the coup. The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a sub-
regional organisation of West African countries, imposed an embargo 
on the supply of arms and military equipment to Sierra Leone by its 
member states, and the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1132, which also imposed an arms embargo. However, 
Sandline, a British private military company, violated the UN arms 
embargo by providing arms and military equipment to the ECOWAS 
military forces and militias supporting the Kabbah administration. 
British government officials including British High Commissioner to 
Sierra Leone became involved in this violation of the UN economic 
sanctions. The Sandline Affair was caused by multiple factors. First, 
arms embargo sanctions against Sierra Leone included the UN 
Security Council resolution and other documents at various levels, and 
each was characterised by different sanction targets and criticism. 
This leads to ambiguity among the relevant parties in terms of their  
awareness of who or what was the target of the sanctions. Second, the 
awareness of British government officials about complying with UN 
sanctions and their implementation as well as their communication 
with each other was insufficient. Third, diverse military actors were 
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involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone, including government troops, 
anti-government guerrillas, sub-regional military forces, militias, and 
private military companies. These diverse actors and the complexity 
of the relationships between them complicated understanding the 
targets of the UN sanctions of the arms embargo.  
 
Keywords: Sierra Leone, Sanctions, United Nations, Sandline, Arms 
Embargoes, United Kingdom 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has passed 
many resolutions imposing non-military sanctions. However, this also 
increases the risk of sanctions violations by member states bound by 
the Security Council’s resolutions. Moreover, in recent years, the UN’s 
non-military sanctions have been increasing quantitatively in terms of 
the number imposed, and undergone a significant, qualitative 
transformation as well. In other words, the targets of the sanctions have 
expanded from the conventional targets of state actors to include non-
state actors such as specific groups and individuals. Furthermore, 
rather than the total embargoes of the past, sanctions are now imposed 
to strategically and flexibly combine several partial (limited) sanctions 
(United Nations Security Council, 2013).  
Expectedly, whenever there are regulations and rules, 
someone somewhere could violate them. It is almost impossible to 
prevent violations of UN sanctions. However, even if it is impossible 
to completely prevent violations of UN sanctions by private sector 
companies and individuals, it is still necessary to prevent the 
participation of government officials in these violations. In particular, 
staff in the ministries of foreign affairs and overseas diplomatic 
missions who are accountable for imposing and implementing UN 
sanctions should not be ‘complicit’ in their violation, regardless of the 
situation. However, this occurred in the Sandline Affair in the United 
Kingdom (UK), which emerged in March 1998 and developed into a 
political scandal that shook the political arena of the country (Kargbo, 
2006: 277–284; Schümer, 2008: 68–70; Zack-Williams, 2012: 25–19). 
In the aftermath of this affair and based on the lessons learned, the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) initiated 
organisational reforms relating to the UN’s non-military sanctions. In 
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July 1998, the FCO established the Sanctions Unit within its United 
Nations Department (UND), aiming to strengthen its system for 
coordination and communication relating to UN sanctions inside and 
outside the FCO and to establish and maintain domestic measures.  
This paper considers the Sandline Affair that occurred in the 
late 1990s in the UK and analyzes the process by which FCO officials 
became involved in violating sanctions. Although the Sandline Affair 
has been examined by several books, reports and articles (e.g. House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 1999; Kargbo, 2006; 
Legg and Ibbs, 1998; Schümer, 2008; Spicer, 1999; Zack-Williams, 
2012), this paper clearly identifies three factors that contributed to 
causing the affair. First, arms embargo sanctions against Sierra Leone 
included the UN Security Council resolution and other documents at 
various levels, and each document had slightly different sanction 
targets. This leads to ambiguity among the relevant parties in terms of 
their awareness of who or what was the target of the sanctions. Second, 
the awareness of British government officials about complying with 
UN sanctions was insufficient. Third, the conflict in Sierra Leone 
involved diverse military actors like government troops, anti-
government guerrillas, sub-regional military forces, militias, and 
private military companies, and this diversity of actors complicated 
understanding the targets of the UN sanctions of the arms embargo. 
However, before considering the Sandline Affair in detail, we first 
describe the start of this affair, which was the embargo of arms to 
Sierra Leone.  
 
Embargoes and Sanctions against Sierra Leone 
The 1997 Military Coup and ECOWAS Sanctions 
A civil war broke out in the small country of Sierra Leone in West 
Africa in March 1991 when an anti-government armed organisation 
called the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) invaded 
from neighbouring Liberia. The RUF invaded the southern and eastern 
parts of Sierra Leone with the support of a Liberian anti-government 
force and Burkina Faso mercenaries, and began developing a guerrilla 
warfare campaign in various places. Furthermore, in the capital city of 
Freetown, a military coup occurred in April 1992, and President 
Joseph Saidu Momoh of the All People’s Congress (APC), the ruling 
party, was overthrown. Captain Valentine Strasser took his place as 
Head of State. Strasser’s military junta rapidly expanded the armed 
forces, and in 1995, concluded a contract with Executive Outcomes 
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(EO), a South African private military company (PMC), outsourcing 
to it operations including military training and reconnaissance. Based 
on the EO activities and other reasons, the war situation temporarily 
developed advantageously for the military junta. However, in January 
1996, Strasser was overthrown in another military coup and replaced 
by Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, who became the Head of State. Bio’s 
military junta conducted the elections previously scheduled by Strasser 
to transfer power to a civilian government. In March that year, Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected 
as the civilian President. Soon after taking office, President Kabbah 
met with Foday Saybana Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, and they 
signed a peace agreement through the mediation of Côte d’Ivoire 
(Abdullah and Muana, 1998: 178–187; Gberie, 2005: 70–96; Richards, 
1996: 7–19; Schümer, 2008: 56–58).  
However, during this process, another military coup occurred 
on 25 May 1997, the third since the outbreak of the conflict. The 
civilian government was overthrown only one year and two months 
since its establishment, and President Kabbah was forced into exile in 
Conakry, the capital of neighbouring Guinea. A military junta headed 
by Major Johnny Paul Koroma was formed, and this regime welcomed 
the anti-government RUF as a collaborator within its administration 
(Gberie, 2004).  
The international community expressed its disapproval of the 
coup. At the time, the West African regional power of Nigeria had 
already deployed hundreds of troops within Sierra Leone, and an 
attempt was made to overthrow the military junta to return President 
Kabbah’s administration to power. However, Nigeria’s independent 
military operations ended in failure. Subsequently, while the military 
government on one side and Nigerian army on the other clashed in 
repeated, sporadic, armed conflicts, negotiations were taking place in 
search of a breakthrough (Gberie, 2005: 97–117).  
On 26 June 1997, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a sub-
regional organisation of West African countries, was held in Conakry. 
The meeting adopted a three-pronged approach towards the Sierra 
Leone military junta: diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, 
and the use of force (as necessary). At the ECOWAS Summit held in 
Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, on 28 and 29 August 1997, a resolution 
on economic sanctions consistent with this three-pronged approach 
was adopted against Sierra Leone. The resolution marked the start of 
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developments in the international community for an arms embargo 
against Sierra Leone (Koroma, 2004: 45–63).  
ECOWAS’s Decision on Sanctions against the Junta in Sierra 
Leone, which it adopted on 29 August 1997, restricted travel by 
members of the Sierra Leone military junta, froze their assets, and 
placed an embargo on petroleum and petroleum products. In addition, 
Article 2 imposed a total embargo on arms to this country, as explained 
in the quote below (italics added for emphasis): 
 
Article 2 
Member states shall place immediately a general and total 
embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms, and 
military equipment to Sierra Leone and abstain from 
transacting any business with that country. To this end, 
Member States shall: 
a. prevent the sale or supply by their nationals or from their 
territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of petroleum 
or petroleum products or arms and related material of all 
types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles 
and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the 
aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, 
to any person or legal entity, for the purpose of any business 
carried out in or operated from the Republic of Sierra Leone, 
and any activities by their nationals or in their territories 
which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or 
supply. (Economic Community of West African States, 1997)  
 
In this way, the ECOWAS sanctions resolution imposed a complete 
embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment to Sierra Leone 
by its member states. However, as shown below, as a sub-regional 
force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
deployed in Sierra Leone was excluded from the targets of the arms 
embargo in Article 6:  
 
       Article 6 
The embargo imposed by this decision shall not apply to 
arms, military equipment, and military assistance meant for 
the exclusive use of the sub-regional forces, which shall be 
responsible for applying the measures contained in the Final 
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Communiqué of the meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs issued on 26 June 1997. (Economic 
Community of West African States, 1997) 
 
In addition, in Article 7, ECOMOG was granted the right to take 
measures to secure the implementation of the sanctions, such as by 
conducting ship inspections:  
 
Article 7 
The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to 
impose the implementation of this decision. They shall 
monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders, and airspace 
of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard, and 
seize any ship, vehicle, or aircraft violating the embargo 
imposed by this decision. (Economic Community of West 
African States, 1997) 
 
Britain-led United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132 
Meanwhile, the British FCO was also pressing for the parallel adoption 
of an economic sanctions resolution against Sierra Leone in the UN 
Security Council in a form that corresponded to the call for economic 
sanctions by the ECOWAS. This movement began as early as June 
1997, immediately after the ECOWAS meeting of foreign ministers 
adopted the three-pronged approach. On 14 July, following a call by 
the UND of the British FCO, a meeting was held to discuss the 
possibility of imposing economic sanctions against Sierra Leone. In 
addition to members of the UND, the meeting was attended by 
members of the FCO’s Africa Department (Equatorial) [AD (E)], the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and HM Customs and 
Excise. At the meeting, the basic policy of the British government was 
reconfirmed, which was to restore to power by peaceful means the 
democratically elected government of President Kabbah. Furthermore, 
attendees acknowledged the adoption of the UN non-military sanctions 
resolution as an effective option for achieving this objective (Legg and 
Ibbs, 1998: 14-15).  
After this meeting, with the UND taking the lead, the 
movement to adopt in the UN Security Council a resolution on 
sanctions against Sierra Leone gathered pace, but the question soon 
arose of how to set the targets on which to impose sanctions. Within 
the FCO, the AD (E), which was the department responsible for Sierra 
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Leone, argued that the only target of the arms embargo should be the 
military junta. However, the UND considered that sanctions targeting 
only the military junta would not be sufficiently effective, and 
advocated that all the forces within Sierra Leone including the Kabbah 
government in exile and ECOMOG should be targeted for sanctions. 
Ultimately, the argument of the latter became the basic policy of the 
British government. However, as previously described, the ECOWAS 
resolution subsequently adopted excluded its own sub-regional force 
(ECOMOG) as targets of the arms embargo. As such, ambiguities and 
discrepancies were evident within the international movement to 
impose an arms embargo on Sierra Leone regarding whether the exiled 
Kabbah government and ECOMOG should also be targeted. 
Subsequently, this became one factor behind the Sandline Affair.  
On 13 August 1997, the British UN delegation telegraphed the 
first draft of the resolution on sanctions against Sierra Leone to the 
FCO in the UK. As a result of adjustments made within the FCO, on 
10 September, an internal document explaining the background to the 
proposed resolution and its contents was sent from the AD (E) to the 
Minister of State, Tony Lloyd. On the same day, it was approved by 
the Foreign Minister, and the FCO telegraphed the UN delegation that 
‘[t]he relevant ministers of the government of the UK have given their 
approval to submit to the Security Council the draft resolution that 
proposes the imposition of an embargo of arms and petroleum against 
Sierra Leone and travel restrictions on the members of its military 
junta’ (Legg and Ibbs, 1998: 15–16).  
On 8 October 1997, the draft resolution on sanctions against 
Sierra Leon proposed by the British was adopted by the UN Security 
Council. This UN Security Council Resolution 1132 expressed the 
Council’s deep concerns about the occurrence of the military coup in 
Sierra Leone, and that it recognised that this situation threatened the 
international peace and security of the region. Therefore, as expressed 
in the quote below, it decided to impose embargoes on arms and 
petroleum as well as travel restrictions on members of the military 
junta. The resolution states as follows (italics added for emphasis): 
 
6. [The Security Council] Decides that all States shall prevent 
the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from 
their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of 
petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related 
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material of all types including weapons and ammunition, 
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and 
spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating 
in their territory. (United Nations Security Council, 1997) 
  
In this way, the content of the UN Security Council Resolution 1132 
placed a complete embargo on the export or supply of arms and 
petroleum products to Sierra Leone. However, it did not exclude from 
the targets of the embargo the military forces that supported the 
Kabbah government in exile or the ECOMOG forces led by Nigerian 
troops. However, in response to the ECOWAS Resolution of August 
1997, as shown below, this resolution recognised the authority of 
ECOWAS to conduct ship inspections and related activities to secure 
the implementation of the sanctions. Acting also under Chapter VIII 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council authorised: 
 
ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected 
Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict 
implementation of the provisions of this resolution relating 
to the supply of petroleum and petroleum products, and 
arms and related material of all types, including, where 
necessary and in conformity with applicable international 
standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to 
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, and calls 
upon all States to cooperate with ECOWAS in this regard.  
           (United Nations Security Council, 1997) 
 
In other words, while Resolution 1132 stipulated a complete embargo 
of arms to Sierra Leone, it recognised the authority of ECOWAS to 
take the measures necessary to ensure the implementation of the 
sanctions in cooperation with the Kabbah administration. As a result, 
to a certain extent, there was room for interpretation as to whether the 
military forces supporting Kabbah and ECOMOG operating in Sierra 
Leone territory were included as targets of the UN arms embargo.  
 
The Sierra Leone (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1997 
Generally, when a Security Council resolution is adopted based on 
Article 41 of the UN Charter, each member country implements its 
own domestic measures. In the case of the UK, when it incorporates a 
decision of the Security Council into its domestic legal system, it 
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‘modifies’ it within its domestic laws. Specifically, when 
implementing a Security Council resolution based on Article 41 of the 
UN Charter, it issues a Statutory Instrument based on the law.  
In the case of Resolution 1132, the response by the British 
government in terms of domestic measures was extremely quick. 
Before the adoption of the resolution, Britain’s FCO had already begun 
preparing a draft Order in Council to serve as an executive order. By 
8 October, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132, the 
FCO legal counsel had already delivered this draft to the UND. On 16 
October, it submitted an internal document requesting the approval of 
the Order in Council by Foreign Minister Lloyd, which was approved 
by the Minister on 21 October and by the Privy Council on 31 October. 
Furthermore, the Order was enforced as early as 1 November 1997 
(Legg and Ibbs, 1998: 19–20).  
In this way, in the formulated Sierra Leone (United Nations 
Sanctions) Order 1997, Article 4 placed a complete embargo on the 
export of arms to Sierra Leone, except in the event of a license issued 
by the Secretary of State (The details are omitted, but in the following 
quotation, ‘the goods specified in Schedule 1 to this Order’ refers to 
arms and other military equipment).  
 
4. Except under the authority of a license granted by the 
Secretary of State under this article, the goods specified in 
Schedule 1 to this Order are prohibited to be exported from 
the UK to any destination in Sierra Leone, or to any 
destination for the purpose of delivery directly or indirectly 
to or to the order of a person connected with Sierra Leone.  
   (United Kingdom Government, 1997) 
 
In Article 2 of the Order, the ‘person connected with Sierra Leone’ 
who was to be the target of the embargo was clearly defined as follows; 
 
‘person connected with Sierra Leone’ means 
 (a) the Government of Sierra Leone; 
 (b) any other person in, or resident in, Sierra Leone; 
 (c) any body incorporated or constituted under the law of Sierra Leone; 
 (d) any body, wherever incorporated or constituted, which is controlled  
      by any of the persons mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) above; 
or 
 (e) any person acting on behalf of any of the persons mentioned in  
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       subparagraph (a) to (d) above.  
 (United Kingdom Government, 1997) 
 
Important here is that in the Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order that 
served as the domestic measure of the UK, the phrase ‘military junta’, 
which was used in the ECOWAS Resolution and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1132, was not used. Rather, ‘the Government of Sierra 
Leone’ and ‘any other person in, or resident in, Sierra Leone’ was used. 
This was the first time that this expression was not explicitly included 
in a description of the target of the sanctions. 
At that time, the British government considered the Kabbah 
government in exile, not the Sierra Leone military junta, the legitimate 
government of the country. As mentioned, even within the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1132, the Kabbah administration was 
positioned as ‘the democratically elected Government of Sierra 
Leone’. That means that regarding the domestic sanctions of the 
British, the unequivocal target of the arms embargo assumed the 
Government of Sierra Leone to be the Kabbah administration, not the 
military junta. In addition, in the Order, the prohibition of arms exports 
applied to ‘any other person in, or resident in, Sierra Leone’, which 
made it illegal for British citizens to supply arms to the military forces 
supporting the Kabbah administration and the ECOMOG. The Order 
also prescribed imprisonment with labour for not more than seven 
years, or a fine, or both for persons violating the embargo. As such, 
while the Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order was originally 
formulated to incorporate UN Security Council Resolution 1132 into 
the British domestic legal system, there was a nuanced difference 
between the two sanctions in terms of the target of the embargo. 
From the foregoing, the ECOWAS sanctions resolution of 
August 1997, which became a signpost for the movement to impose 
an arms embargo on Sierra Leone, set the country as the geographic 
target of the arms embargo, but excluded the ECOMOG. However, the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1132, adopted in October the same 
year, while stipulating Sierra Leone as the target area of the arms 
embargo, did not explicitly include a phrase excluding the ECOMOG 
and related organisations. However, this resolution recognised the 
authority of the ECOWAS to ensure the implementation of the 
sanctions in cooperation with the Kabbah administration. Finally, the 
British Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order, implemented in November 
that year, prescribed ‘the Sierra Leone government’ and ‘any other 
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person in, or resident in, Sierra Leone’ as the targets of the sanctions. 
In principle, this made it illegal to supply arms to the Kabbah 
administration and ECOMOG forces operating in Sierra Leone 
territory.  
Among the three arms embargo sanctions against Sierra 
Leone, the original ECOWAS Resolution only restricted West African 
countries. Furthermore, even if the content of the same resolution 
contradicted the content of the UN Security Council Resolution 1132 
or that of the British Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order, this was not 
a problem legally. However, we must be aware that while the 
ECOWAS Resolution was on the West African region level, the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1132 was on the international community 
level and the Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order on the British 
domestic level. Therefore, despite no clear discrepancies or 
inconsistencies between the arms embargo sanctions against Sierra 
Leone on the three levels, there were subtle differences between them 
in terms of the targets of the sanctions. Furthermore, this hints at the 
occurrence of the subsequent Sandline Affair described in detail in the 
next section.  
 
Arms Export by Sandline 
The Sandline Affair began when Rakesh Saxena, a businessman of the 
Blackstone Capital Corporation in Vancouver, Canada, contacted 
Sandline International, a PMC based in London, in June 1997, 
immediately after the third coup in Sierra Leone. Saxena requested that 
Sandline form a military plan to return to power the Kabbah 
administration, which had been overthrown in the coup. The Sandline 
representative, Tim Spicer, flew to Conakry, Guinea, immediately 
after receiving Saxena’s request, and met with Sam Hinga Norman and 
other leaders of the military forces supporting the Kabbah 
administration to formulate the plan. On 23 December, following 
frequent international telephone conversations and fax exchanges 
between the three parties - Kabbah in Conakry, Saxena in Vancouver, 
and Spicer in London - two contracts were concluded (Spicer, 1999: 
192–193, 196).  
         Figure 1 simplifies the content of these two contracts. As shown 
in the figure, Kabbah first concluded a fundraising contract with 
Saxena (Contract A). The content of this contract stipulated that the 
Saxena side would provide funds of US$10 million to support the 
return to power of the Kabbah administration, and in return, Kabbah 
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would preferentially allocate diamond mining rights to Blackstone 
after it returned to power. One more contract was concluded between 
Kabbah and Spicer for the procurement of arms and military training 
(Contract B). The content of this contract stated that the Kabbah side 
would pay to Sandline the US$10 million provided to it by Saxena, 
and in return, Sandline would provide arms and military training to the 
militia organisation that supported the Kabbah administration (called 
‘Kamajors’).  
          Subsequently, Saxena was unable to raise the initially promised 
funds of US$10 million, finally securing only US$1.5 million, which 
Sandline used to purchase arms in Bulgaria. On 2 February 1998, 35 
tons of military equipment including AK-47 automatic rifles arrived 
via Nigeria at Lungi International Airport near Freetown. These were 
handed over to the ECOMOG. Some of these weapons were later 
supplied to the Kamajors through the ECOMOG.  
          However, by the time the weapons procured by Sandline arrived 
in Sierra Leone, the military junta had already been overthrown. On 6 
February, two and a half weeks before the weapons arrived, the 
ECOMOG had launched a total military attack against the military 
junta. By 12 February, it had seized control of nearly all of the city of 
Freetown. As a result, the weapons procured by Sandline became 
useless ‘white elephants’. After learning that the military junta had 
been overthrown, and troubled by this unexpected development, 
Kabbah cancelled the contract he had concluded with Saxena, stating 
that the Saxena side had defaulted on the contract as his reason. 
However, the contract with Sandline could not be cancelled, as arms 
procurement was already progressing. Consequently, military 
equipment including weapons was delivered to Freetown after the 
collapse of the military junta.  
           In March 1998, an English newspaper reported the facts of the 
illegal export of arms by Sandline to Sierra Leone, unveiling the details 
of this affair. In April, the British customs authorities launched a 
compulsory criminal investigation against Sandline. However, by late 
May, even though the investigating authorities deemed that the exports 
of arms by Sandline to Sierra Leone was illegal because it violated the 
arms embargo, it made the final ruling that it would not be in the public 
interest to institute criminal proceedings against the relevant parties.  
However, while the judicial ruling was scheduled around two 
months after the discovery of the matter, the Sandline Affair developed 
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into a major political scandal in Britain. The focus of the scandal was 
the suspicion that British government officials, and especially 
members of the FCO, were involved in the export of arms to Sierra 
Leone by Sandline, violating UN sanctions. 
 
Figure 1. The Two Contracts related to the Sandline Affair 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
                                   1. The funding of US$10 million 
                                                                          3. Payment             
         2. Diamond                                                                
               mining rights                                                                                       4. The supply of  
          arms and    
                                                                                                               training  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Involvement of British Foreign Officials 
British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone 
Among the British FCO officials, Peter Penfold was considered the 
most deeply involved in the export of arms to Sierra Leone by 
Sandline. At the time, he was the British High Commissioner to Sierra 
Leone. Penfold followed the Kabbah government in exile and 
evacuated to Conakry following the military coup on 25 May 1997. At 
the time, the British FCO took the bold step of evacuating its High 
Commissioner to Conakry, which did not have a British diplomatic 
mission, rather than to London or another city in West Africa. In so 
doing, it aimed to strongly appeal for support for the Kabbah 
Saxena 
Blackstone 
(Vancouver) 
 
Spicer 
Sandline 
(London) 
 
Contract 
A 
Contract
B 
President Kabbah 
Government of Sierra 
Leone in Exile 
(Conakry) 
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government in exile. On the other hand, Penfold was required to 
exchange documents with the FCO, relying mainly on the fax of the 
hotel he was staying in, because Conakry did not have a British 
diplomatic mission he could use. As a result, he was not able to receive 
sufficient information about the developments inside and outside the 
UK on the sanctions against Sierra Leone. Specifically, while in 
Conakry, the FCO did not send to Penfold in document form the details 
of the executive order that specified the target of the arms embargo as 
the Sierra Leone government. Therefore, for a long time, he was 
unaware that the Kabbah administration was included as a target of the 
arms embargo. Apparently, the first time Penfold saw the text of the 
Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order was on 30 April 1998, after the 
discovery of the arms exports (House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee, 1999: par. 39–43; Legg and Ibbs, 1998: 131).  
However, Penfold was not the only person to ‘misunderstand’ 
that the target of the UN Security Council Resolution 1132 arms 
embargo was only the military junta and did not include the Kabbah 
administration. For example, when the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in Edinburgh in October 1997 adopted the 
Edinburgh Communiqué, which included the passage below:  
 
Heads of Government welcomed UN Security Council 
Resolution 1132 (1997) imposing petroleum, weapons, and 
travel sanctions on the military junta in Sierra Leone and 
authorising ECOWAS to impose economic measures against 
the regime. They urged member governments to co-operate 
in the implementation of these sanctions, and in ensuring the 
continued isolation of the regime in Freetown within the 
Commonwealth and the wider international community.  
   (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1997) 
 
The Communiqué also contained a phrase suggesting that only the 
military junta was the target of sanctions from the UN Resolution 
1132. Certainly, the military junta was unequivocally the target of UN 
economic sanctions, and as such, it is not the case that there was a 
mistake in the phrasing used in the Edinburgh Communiqué. However, 
as earlier stated, Resolution 1132 did not limit the targets of the arms 
embargo sanctions to only the military junta. Rather, it targeted the 
entire geographic area known as Sierra Leone. Therefore, the phrasing 
in this communiqué was misleading. In addition, many officials 
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involved in problems related to Sierra Leone including Penfold and 
Kabbah attended the meeting in Edinburgh. Considering this, the 
vague understanding and misunderstanding of who Resolution 1132 
targeted, which was frequent among the relevant officials at the time, 
was symbolically expressed in the phrasing of this communiqué, even 
if unintentionally.  
Conversely, on 19 December 1997, Penfold met with Kabbah 
in Conakry, who presented him with a document: a draft of the two 
contracts that Kabbah was going to conclude with Saxena and Spicer 
to procure arms. While the word ‘arms’ was not clearly used in the 
document, on seeing the contract amount of US$10 million, Penfold 
was likely aware that the procurement of arms was included (Legg and 
Ibbs, 1998: 40). In addition, on 28 January 1998, Penfold visited 
Sandline in London and met with Spicer, who handed him a copy of a 
proposal named ‘Project Python’. It described a military plan for 
overthrowing the military junta and returning the Kabbah 
administration to power. The following day, Penfold visited the FCO 
and submitted a copy of the project to the staff of the AD (E). 
Moreover, in late February 1998, when the arms arrived in Freetown, 
Penfold received a phone call from a Sandline official and was 
informed that ‘some equipment’ had arrived at Lungi International 
Airport (Legg and Ibbs, 1998: 43).  
In this way, it would appear that High Commissioner Penfold 
was repeatedly and frequently in contact with Sandline, without being 
aware that Sandline’s export of arms to Sierra Leone violated the UN 
sanction or the British executive order. This resulted in important 
grounds for Sandline’s claims that the export of arms to Sierra Leone 
was carried out with the advance approval of the British government 
(Legg and Ibbs, 1998: 119–122).  
 
Foreign Officials in London 
Penfold was not the only FCO official suspected of being involved in 
the illegal export of arms to Sierra Leone by Sandline. When exporting 
weapons to Sierra Leone, Sandline actively interacted with the FCO, 
particularly with the staff of the AD (E). For example, when Kabbah 
lost power in the military coup, Spicer telephoned John Everard, 
Deputy Head of the AD (E), to confirm the intentions of the British 
government regarding the possibility of using the EO to overthrow the 
military junta by force. Subsequently, Spicer telephoned Everard on 
numerous occasions. On 10 December 1997, a member of Branch 
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Energy, a Sandline affiliated company, visited the FCO and met with 
Everard of the AD (E) and several other officials.  
Everard eventually began having concerns about Sandline’s 
approach. In particular, when he received a telephone call from Spicer 
on 5 January 1998, around when he was about to hand over his position 
to a successor, he was informed that Sandline had received an order 
for a contract worth US$10 million from the Kabbah administration. 
Everard decided it would not be desirable to give the impression that 
the British government had in some way approved the contract. He 
therefore prepared a memo in which he stated that even if government 
officials had telephone conversations with Sandline officials, in 
principle, they should avoid direct meetings with them. He submitted 
the memo to his superior, the Head of the AD (E) Ann Grant (Legg 
and Ibbs, 1998: 123–126).  
Despite this, following a telephone request by Spicer, 
Everard’s successor Deputy Head Craig Murray met with Spicer on 19 
January 1998 together with Tim Andrews, another member of the 
Division. According to Deputy Head Murray, the purpose of the 
meeting was to get an idea of Spicer’s personality as the Sandline 
representative. However, this contact exacerbated suspicions about the 
involvement of FCO officials in the Sandline Affair (Legg and Ibbs, 
1998: 54).  
According to Spicer’s testimony, during the meeting held that 
day, he explained to the FCO the details of the contract between 
Sandline and the Kabbah administration, to which the FCO indicated 
its understanding. Spicer emphasised that at that time, although the 
FCO generally mentioned the UN Security Council Resolution 1132, 
it did not explain the Sierra Leone (UN Sanctions) Order or highlight 
any illegality in the contract Sandline had concluded with Kabbah. In 
response, Murray testified that although Spicer broadly explained the 
contract with the Kabbah administration, he did not mention that it 
included the procurement of arms. Murray also emphasised that 
although he felt that a contract amount of US$10 million was certainly 
considerable, he could not conclude from this that it included the 
export of arms (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 
1999: par. 32–33).  
In this way, the opinions about what occurred at the meeting 
on 19 January 1998 differed between Spicer and Murray. Spicer 
argued that he had explained to the FCO the exports of arms to Sierra 
Leone and received its de-facto approval, while Murray argued that the 
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FCO did not receive any clear explanation from Sandline about the 
arms exports. Staff member Andrews, who was also present at this 
meeting, took records of the content of the discussion between the two 
men. However, these records were a simplified memo of less than 200 
words. Therefore, there were also deficiencies in the creation of 
records, and ultimately in the subsequent hearings and investigation, it 
was not possible to determine who was telling the truth between Spicer 
and Murray (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 
1999: par. 34). Whatever the case, the fact that Murray did not follow 
the advice of his predecessor Everard and met with a Sandline official 
was an imprudent act that fuelled the suspicion that government 
officials were involved in the illegal export of arms to Sierra Leone.  
In addition, senior officials in the FCO also committed a 
number of errors of judgment or were negligent regarding the illegal 
export of arms to Sierra Leone. For example, by the end of January 
1998, which was before the arrival of the arms, AD (E) Director Grant 
and Africa Section Director Richard Dales had already received 
information on the illegal export of arms by Sandline and the suspected 
involvement in it of High Commissioner Penfold. Despite this, he did 
not immediately take appropriate measures, because he had other work 
duties. Furthermore, at the end of March the same year, Permanent 
Secretary John Kerr received a report that the customs authorities may 
soon initiate a compulsory criminal investigation of Sandline, which 
they initiated in early April. However, Kerr did not immediately report 
the details of the export of arms to Sierra Leone to the relevant Cabinet 
ministers. Consequently, the understanding of the details of this affair 
among the relevant Cabinet ministers was delayed, and the first time 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook became aware of the possible 
involvement of FCO officials in the illegal export of arms was only on 
28 April 1998, approximately two months after the affair came to light. 
These errors of judgment at various levels within the FCO, its 
inadequate sharing of information, and delays in response culminated 
in the Sandline Affair developing from a case of the illegal export of 
arms by a British private company into a scandal involving FCO 
officials in the violation of UN sanctions.  
 
Conclusion 
The Sandline Affair arose from the interplay of multiple factors. First, 
sanctions against Sierra Leone included the UN Security Council 
resolution and other documents at various levels comprising the 
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ECOWAS resolution, Communiqué of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, and British domestic order that incorporated the 
UN sanctions into its domestic laws. Each was characterised by 
different sanction targets and criticism. This leads to ambiguity among 
the relevant parties in terms of their awareness of who or what was the 
target of the sanctions. 
Second, the awareness of British FCO officials about 
complying with UN sanctions and their implementation as well as their 
communication with each other was insufficient. In particular, in May 
1997 after the military coup, High Commissioner Penfold followed the 
Kabbah government in exile and evacuated from Freetown to Conakry, 
where no British diplomatic mission was located. Therefore, he could 
claim that he did not receive sufficient information on the 
developments inside and outside the UK about the sanctions against 
Sierra Leone.  
Third, diverse military actors were involved in the conflict in 
Sierra Leone, including government troops, anti-government 
guerrillas like the RUF, sub-regional organisations like the ECOMOG, 
militia like the Kamajors, and the EO such as PMC. Furthermore, the 
Government of Sierra Leone was never a single entity, and the 
interpretation of what actually was the government was complex, for 
example, the existence of the military junta and the government in 
exile. These diverse actors and the complexity of the relationships 
between them complicated understanding the targets of the sanctions 
of the arms embargo.  
After the Sandline Affair, the British FCO established an 
independent investigative committee to investigate the FCO’s 
involvement (Legg and Ibbs, 1998). In addition, based on the painful 
lessons learned, it initiated organisational reforms regarding UN non-
military sanctions, and in 1998, newly constituted the Sanctions Unit 
to establish and maintain a system inside and outside the FCO for UN 
sanctions. Furthermore, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee interviewed independent witnesses and investigated the 
affair. Specifically, in the report on the investigation by the latter, 35 
items were presented as conclusions and recommendations for the 
FCO policy in the future regarding UN arms embargoes and the code 
of conduct for FCO officials (House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee, 1999).  
On the other hand, in terms of the subsequent UN sanctions 
against Sierra Leone, following the return to power of the Kabbah 
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administration, a new UN Security Council resolution was adopted on 
16 March 1998, and the petroleum embargo was lifted (UN Security 
Council Resolution 1156). On 5 June, Resolution 1132 was rendered 
ineffective, and new arms embargo sanctions against Sierra Leone 
were imposed (UN Security Council Resolution 1171). In this 
resolution, the target of the arms embargo was limited to non-
government forces, and the Kabbah administration was removed as the 
target. Furthermore, the ECOMOG and UN PKO were also removed 
as targets of the arms embargo, with the intention of limiting and 
clarifying the targets of the sanctions.  
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